POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE

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1.

Twenty years have passed since the beginning of the fundamental and thorough system transformations in Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries. After the initial euphoria, the difficulties of the transformation period came, while the road to democratic and market system became more and more difficult and filled with social sacrifice. At the beginning of the 1990s, the study of political science optimistically presumed that there is one model of post-communist transformation, and that the consolidation was a matter of time, a short period of time, as we thought. However, a closer look at the transformations in the discussed region of Europe verified this optimistic assumption. Today, we can say it without doubt that there is not any common transformation model in Central and Eastern Europe. The course of transformation depends on many notions of inner and outer nature. We should mention these aspects: possession (or the lack of possession) of tradition of own statehood, possession of democratic or authoritarian traditions; a degree to which there has been a relationship with Western civilization and a degree of civilization development.

In the borders of vast Central and Eastern Europe it seems relevant to single out three regions – the first one embraces Central Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, supposedly, the area of the former GDR);[1] the second one encloses the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and the third one embraces the Balkans (Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albany).[2] The given distinction seems relevant because it gathers the most important aspects which differentiate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, namely: the lack of individual statehood in the years of 1940-1991 and the status of union republic within the Soviet Union, and quite a high degree of social-economic development (Baltic countries).[3] As *Ralf Dahrendorf* noticed: Every country in Central and Eastern Europe

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[1] A detailed analysis of the system transformations in the Central European countries, see *Demokracje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w perspektywie porównawczej*, [eds.: Antoszewski, A. – Herbut, R.). Wrocław, 1997.; *Państwa Wyszehradzkie. Systemy polityczne, gospodarka, współpraca* (ed.: Szczepaniak, M.). Poznań, 1996.; A. Wolff-Powęska, *Oswojona rewolucja*. Poznań, 1998.; Szczepaniak, M. – Zyborowicz, S.: *Przebudowa ustroju politycznego na Węgrzech i w Czechosłowacji*. Poznań 1995; Bankowicz, M.: *Systemy władzy państwowej Czechosłowacji I Czech*. Kraków, 1998.; Góralczyk, B.: *Węgry. Transformacja pokomunistyczna. 1990-2003*. Warszawa, 2003.; *Wewnętrzno-polityczne i międzynarodowe aspekty jedności Niemiec* (ed.: Wojtaszczyk, K. A.). Warszawa, 1991.

[2] Cf. Holmes, L.: *Post-Communism. An Introduction*, Durham 1997. 65. Swain, N.: *Eastern Europe since 1945*. Palgrave, 1998.

[3] A detailed analysis of system transformations in the Baltic countries, see Zieliński, J.: *Instytucjonalizacja przemian ustrojowych na Litwie, w Łotwie i w Estonii*. Warszawa, 2004.

has its own history and political culture. One of the joys of the year 1989 is a new discovery of these differences.[4]

On the other hand, Central European countries are characterized by a long tradition of individual statehood (with the exceptional position of Slovakia), a high degree of social-economic development, a democratic tradition reaching back to the Noble Republic in Poland, at the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and later First Republic (1918-1938) in the Czech Republic, while in Hungary, it can be traced back to the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[5] Certain setback in the functioning of the democratic system constitutes a common characteristic of the first and second group countries as the period of the 1920s brought about a breakage in the liberal and democratic institution, as well as in the wave of authoritarian regimes.[6]

An honourable exception among the discussed group of countries is Czechoslovakia, in which parliament systems survived the whole interwar period. As *Timothy Garton Ash* emphasizes,[7] the term 'Central Europe' (or Central and Eastern Europe) only played a useful role because it reminded American or British people that East Berlin, Prague or Budapest were in slightly different positions than Kiev or Vladivostok, and that Siberia did not stand and leg behind the Berlin Wall.[8] What is more, *Jan Przewłocki*[9] draws the attention to the fact that during the centuries, the term 'Central Europe1 has undergone great changes regarding its political perspective. After 1945, Europe was divided to West and East. In international politics, only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the whole block of communist states, there was a comeback to the term 'Central Europe' by relating it to the countries of the Visegrad Group: Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.

2.

The term *'Central Europe'* (German: *Mitteleuropa*) was created at the beginning of the 20th century and was used in the practical political and economic life of Germany. January, 1904 can be set as the symbolic date when the Central European Association, which aimed at the economic integration of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire (with exceptional enlarging to Switzerland and Benelux) under German command, was organized in Europe. On the other hand, in 1915 *Friedrich Neumann* published a political essay entitled *Mitteleuropa*, which presented the intention of creating a German sphere of influence in this part of

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[4] Cf. Dahrendorf, R.: *Rozważania nad rewolucją w Europie.* Warszawa, 1991. 15.

[5] *Jerzy Tomaszewski* places former areas of Habsburg Monarchy in the Central Europe, while former territories of Ottoman Empire in South Eastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albany). See Tomaszewski, J.: *Europa Środkowa i Południowo-Wschodnia: cechy charakterystyczne i granice regionu,* „Ekonomia", z. 36, 1976. Stańczyk, J.: *Europa Środkowa- kryteria wyodrębnienia i cechy regionu,* „Studia Polityczne", No. 12, Warszawa, 2001. 197.

[6] Cf. *Dictatorships in East-Central Europe 1918-1939* (ed.: Żarnowski, J.). Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk-Łodź, 1983.

[7] Cf. Ash, T. G.: Pomimo i wbrew. Eseje o Europie Środkowej. London, 1990. 169.

[8] *Zbigniew Brzeziński* points the attention to the function of the term in defining the given European region in international relations by emphasizing that in the end of 1980s, when the Soviet Union found itself in a weaker position, the role of Eastern Europe countries became more and more important. These countries defined themselves as Central Europe to point the distance in relations to the Soviet Union. See Brzeziński, Z.: *Powrót do Europy Środkowej,* „Aneks", 1988. No. 49. 9.

[9] See Przewlocki, J.: *Wstęp,* [w:] *Europa Środkowa jako obszar interesów regionalnych* (ed.: Przewłocki, J.). Katowice, 1999. 7.

Europe.[10] After the German defeat in the First World War, the term Central Europe has gained a new meaning - it meant integration aims on behalf of newly created countries (Little Entente, Isthmus).[11]

Milan Kundera points out to another aspect of defining Central Europe.[12] According to Kundera, borders are not markers of "Central Europeanness" (as they are unauthentic, forced by invasions and won battles). These markers are constituted by common fundamental situations which more and more group the nations in the notional and changeable borders, inside which there is one unchangeable memory, the same experience and the common tradition. Following the same path, *George Urban* draws the attention to the fact that we can differentiate Central European mentality, which appears within the borders of the former Habsburg Empire and which encloses: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, a part of Poland (Galicia), a part of Yugoslavia (Slovenia and Croatia), as well as a part of Romania (Transylvania). This mentality possesses already the mentioned cultural background and historic identity, or even identity regarding the taste, lifestyle, literary style and poetic depiction. On the other hand, *Bronisław Geremek* emphasizes that Central European identity can be characterized as a clash of historic past of life on the suburbs of the West and an obsessive thinking about disconnecting with this civilization along with the current aim to fuse with the West, namely, with the communal European construction.[13]

3.

The third group of Central Eastern European countries consists of the Balkans.[14] In geographic terms – as *Mieczysław Tanty*[15] mentions – the given area encompasses the Balkan Peninsula with the joining islands of the Aegean, Ionian and Adriatic Sea. Turkish traits: Bosporus and Dardanelles create a border between the Balkans and Asia, while their Northern border constitutes of the rivers Sawa and a Southern part of Danube till the Black Sea, which is its Eastern boundary. Nevertheless, in the historic sense, the area of the Balkans unites Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia (and the countries created after its dissolution) as well as Turkey. It is an area of generally weaker pace of social-economic development, of a shorter democratic tradition than in Central and Eastern Europe. Another common characteristic is a few centuries period of Ottoman Empire's rule, ended by the process of progressive superseding of Turkish power from the European continent (beginning from the second half of the 19th century (Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia) until the First World War (Albania, Macedonia).[16] As emphasised by Mieczyslaw Tanty,[17]

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[10] See Halecki, O.: *Historia Europy. Jej granice i podziały*, Lublin, 2002. 121. In his paper written in the half of the 20th century, Polish historian shows the reason for individualisation of two Central European regions- The West, German part (Austria) and the East part- non-German one. See *ibid.* 128.

[11] See Podraza, A.: *Europa Środkowa. Zakres przestrzenny i historia regionu.* „Prace Komisji Środkowoeuropejskiej", Kraków, 1993. 23.

[12] See Kundera, M.: *Zachód porwany albo tragedia Europy Środkowej*, „Zeszyty Literackie", No. 1984.

[13] See Geremek, B.: *Tożsamość Europy Środkowej*, „Przegląd Polityczny", No. 26, 1994. 52.

[14] Tomasz Wituch points the attention to term „The Balkans" in contemporary European languages which define the term: i) as Bulgarian mountain passage, ii) to define the Peninsula and iii) to speak about European region which has a very specific historic, ethnic, political and cultural background. See Wituch, T.: *Bałkany –szkic definicji*, „Dzieje Najnowsze", No. 2, 1998. 135.

[15] Tanty, M.: Bałkany w XX wieku. Dzieje polityczne. Warszawa, 2003. 8

[16] Wituch, T.: *Bałkany w Europie XX wieku*, „Dzieje Najnowsze", No. 2, 1998.; Tanty: *Bałkany w XX wieku…,* 8.

the Turkish captivity significantly delayed the economic-social and cultural development of the Balkan nations. However, the degree of development in the each country was very different. The first nations to start the process of capitalism were the Greeks, then the Romans, the Serbs and the Bulgarians. The greatest underdevelopment was observed in the hilly Albania and Macedonia (at the beginning of the 20th century patriarchal relations still remained there).

Barbara Jelavich, an American historian of slavic ancestry draws the attention to a differentiation of historic roots of the Balkans.[18] The Balkan Peninsula placed at the junction of Europe, Africa and Asia, gathers parts of ancient Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman and Habsburg territories. During the centuries it has been influenced by various imperial tendencies and competing ideologies. In the different historic periods the Balkan territory had main political and cultural borders: between the Byzantine Empire and the Eastern Roman Empire; between Islam and Christianity, between Orthodox Church and Catholicism, while, after 1945 between two competitive political-army blocks (NATO and the Warsaw Pact).[19]

Božidar Jezernik, a Slovak ethnologist and anthropologist of culture hits the spot when he says that a popular image of the Balkans showed the region as „the European epicentre of storms" and „the Wild Europe".[20] As a result, the Balkans was depicted as the worse part of Europe. While the European countries were considered to be active, industrialized, developed and modern, the Balkan countries were described as passive, rural, underdeveloped, stuck in stagnation, with a tendency of despotism and being far from progression. The given notion is developed and thoroughly analysed by *Maria Todorova* who emphasizes that the term „balkanization" began to refer not only to comminuting divisions of greater political organisms, but it became a synonym of a return to tribal reality, underdevelopment and barbarity.[21] The Balkans was permanently defined as the „Other Europe". It has largely been regarded, also not multilaterally, that the region's inhabitants do not desire to accept the norms common for the civilized world.

Attila Ágh shows a differentiation of the Central Eastern European area and the relevance of distinction of Central Europe and the Balkans.[22] Central Europe is a region closer to Western Europe with regards to civilization (through cultural, religious tradition); at least because since the 16th century it has been treated a semi-suburban part of the West. This fact was originated from the historic tradition, a fact of belonging to the Habsburg Monarchy. In Central Europe economic, social and political development progressed earlier than in the Balkans (industrialization took place in the first half of 19th century). The self-identification of the region, as Central Europe played a significant role in the process of peaceful and negotiable system transformations after 1989, was additionally reflected in the creation of regional organizations (Visegrad Group and CEFTA), which were important in the process of the European integration. Howeer, the basic difference was that in Central Europe there is a process of *re-democratization* (the region had its democratic tradition and institutions before), while in the Balkans there is a process of *democratization* (generally, the first serious attempt to form democratic institutions).

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[17] Tanty, M.: *Konflikty bałkańskie*. Warszawa, 1968. 8.
[18] See Jelavich, B.: Historia Bałkanów. Wiek XVIII i XIX, T.1, Kraków, 2005. 9.
[19] It should be mentioned that two countries, Albania (since 1961) and Yugoslavia (since 1948) constituted a buffer background as they did not belong to any of the mentioned blocks.
[20] Jezernik, B.: Dzika Europa. Bałkany w oczach zachodnich podróżników. Kraków, 2007. VIII-IX
[21] Todorova, M.: *Bałkany wyobrażone*. Wołowiec, 2008. 19.
[22] Ágh, Attila: *The Politics of Central Europe*. London, 1998. 4.

4.

Generally, a few possible scenarios of political changes can be pointed out in Central and Eastern European countries. The first one is described as an escape forward or as a historic compromise.[23] It assumed the takeover of power by reform fractions, progressive liberalization of the political system at the end of the 1980s, half-legal functioning of independent groupings and opposition *protoparties*. A similar scenario took place in three countries of Central Europe: Poland, Hungary and Slovenia. In 1989, representatives of the communist government and of opposition met to discuss how to democratize the political system. The talks were of formal character in Poland (round table talks) and Hungary, while less formal in Slovenia (as republic of Yugoslavia). The following changes were of elite nature, the political contract was discussed on the level of the state-party leadership and the elite of opposition groupings (in Poland the main partner of the negotiations, NSZZ Solidarność was rather understood as social-political movement than a syndicalist camp). We should add that in Hungary there was a certain modification of the contract as a result of a referendum which took place on 26th November, 1989. It was then decided that presidential elections would happen only after the parliament elections. It is also interesting to observe that negotiations took place in a certain sequence - first Poland (February-April 1989), then Hungary (June-September 1989), and finally, Slovenia (as republic of Yugoslavia) (September 1989).

Judging from a certain perspective, certain points of the Polish contract (ex. contract elections) may seem a little radical in comparison with the Hungarian or the Slovenian decisions but we have to remember who began the sequence of events.

The second scenario took place in two other countries of Central Europe, namely, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. These countries had to deal with conservative (or concrete) party leadership, which were much against any political democratic transformation of the contemporary social-political system. What is more, the two countries were the richest communist states which had largely stable economic situation at the end of the 1980s. One of the members of the Czech party leaders used to say that as long as there was sausage and beer, socialism in Czechoslovakia was secure. The opposition was less organized as independent activity was more repressed than in the first group of countries. Under the influence of events in Poland and Hungary a political revival happened first in GDR (September-October), and then in Czechoslovakia. The unwillingness of the party leaders to an open dialogue resulted in social discontent – Monday Demonstration in Dresden on 7th October, 1989 in Berlin, and the Velvet Revolution on 17th November, 1989 in Prague. Communist elites were not prepared for a scenario of radical political changes. As a result of explosion of social discontent, the political initiative was passed to the opposition which wasted no time to organize its own structures (OF in Czechoslovakia, VPN in Slovakia). However, in the GDR, the sequence of events was different as there transformation happened through the union with the second German country.[24]

[23] The author refers to the models proposed by *Jerzy Wiatr*, nevertheless somehow modified See Wiatr, J.: *Socjologia wielkiej przemiany*. Warszawa, 1999.; the same author: *Europa pokomunistyczna*. Warszawa, 2006.

[24] Serczyk, J.: *Podzielone Niemcy*. Toruń, 1994.; *Zjednoczenie Niemiec. Aspekty politologiczno-ekonomiczno-prawne* (eds.: Janicki, L. – Koszel, B. – Wilczyński, W.). Poznań, 1996.; Wolle, S.: *Wspaniały świat dyktatury*. Warszawa, 2003.; Jaskułowski, T.: *Pokojowa rewolucja w NRD w latach 1989-1990. Geneza-przebieg-efekty*.

On the other hand, in the Balkan countries the strength of communist groupings was much greater, the opposition was less organized, and the democratic tradition was less significant than in the countries of Central Europe. In general terms, we can distinguish a Balkan model of a controlled opening of the political system (Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Serbia and other Yugoslavian republics with the exception of Croatia). The initiative of political changes appeared under the influence of events in Central Europe, while the course of political transformation remained under the control of the party. In Yugoslavia, we can observe a model of dissolution of the federal state, the reason for political changes was not democratization but the creation of individual state organisms. Romania, where the palace revolution caused by the communist elite took place, also belongs to this model of changes. Nevertheless, Croatia in the first part of the transformations reminded of a model of controlled opening, however, the national factor strongly influenced the political transformation, which was emphasized by the massive support of the programme of HDZ, a camp of *Franjo Tudjman*.[25]

5.

The crucial question asked by politicians and constitutionalists of the post-communist countries was whether to lay the fundaments of a new governmental system on parliamentary system or on strong presidential power. *Andrzej Antoszewski* wisely noticed that although, the theoretic discussion focused on advantages and disadvantages of the pure parliamentary system or presidential system, political controversy, in fact, focused on one aspect only - the position of the president against other decision groups – especially, against the government and the parliament.[26] In general, politicians and legislators could refer to three kinds of solution: the one ruling in stable democratic states (the Fifth French Republic, chancellor system of FRG); the one functioning in the post-communist period (the First Republic of Czechoslovakia, the Second Polish Republic, perhaps pre-war institutions of Romania or Hungary) and the one which had been worked out during the communist rule (the system of economic self-government in the case of Slovenian State Council; institution of a president in Romania and Yugoslavia; the works of parliamentary committees in Poland and Hungary).[27]

Historic experience in the case of the discussed countries could not have a decisive role. It is enough to say that only the Checks, Slovaks, Slovenians, Croatians and Hungarians could refer to the idea of parliamentary system of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Parliamentary experiences of the other Yugoslavian republics were less advanced (ex. in Montenegro the parliament was organized in 1905, in Macedonia even later). Long traditions of parliamentary system were rooted in Poland. The political transformation was

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Wrocław, 2007.; Bankowicz, M.: *Zlikwidowane państwo*. Kraków, 2003.; Wolchik, S. L.: *Czechoslovakia in transition: Politics, Economics and Society*. London and New York, 1991.

[25] *Politics, power and the struggle* for democracy in South-East Europe (eds.: Dawisha, K. – Parrott, B.). Cambridge, 1997.; Roper, S.: *Romania: the unfinished revolution*. Amsterdam, 2000.; Klejn, Z.: *Bułgaria. Szkice do dziejów najnowszych*. Pułtusk, 2005.

[26] See Antoszewski, A.: Forma rządu, Demokracje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w perspektywie porównawczej. Wroclaw, 1997. 58.

[27] Wyrzykowski, M.: *Recepcja w prawie publicznym – tendencje rozwojowe konstytucjonalizmu w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej*, „Państwo i Prawo", No. 11. 1992.; Sokolewicz, W.: Demokracja, rządy prawa i konstytucyjność w postsocjalistycznym społeczeństwie Europy Wschodniej. In: *Zagadnienia prawa konstytucyjnego. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Tadeusza Szymczaka*. Łódź, 1994.

set and conditioned through the economic breakdown, reviving national tensions. The dangers against new democratic institutions influenced politicians to seek a governmental model which would rely on a strong executive system.[28] What is more, deep traditions of an individual's[29] great power remained in the Balkan countries.

In general, the most commonly accepted model was a republican one, influences of royalists were not strong enough in any of the discussed post-communist countries. Balkan and Central European countries introduced a republican form of government. Among the newly created states from the Yugoslavian Federation, only the Republic of Macedonia reflected tendencies to introduce monarchy, so did Serbia, only to a much lesser degree. These tendencies were reflected in the claims to return to monarchy, made by some of the important political groupings (ex. SPO and SRS in Serbia).

Post-Yugoslavian republics introduced various political models. It was not common to refer to solutions offered by a federal system because of the belief that federal solutions were unreliable and because of the negative relation to a common state in some republics (especially Slovenia, Croatia). On the other hand, Albania, which did not have a long state or democratic tradition (the first four years before 1924), had to use foreign solutions by adjusting them to its inner reality.

At the beginning of the 1990s, legislators of the post-Yugoslavian states had to face the necessity of making the choice of governmental system which would be adequate to the political tradition and to the outer situation of the country creation (military conflict in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina). We also have to mention dominative tendencies of the ruling elites (strong personalities such as S. Milosevic in Serbia).

Among the countries of Eastern Europe a parliamentary-cabinet model dominated, often modified by the institutions which enforced the executive power (constructive vote against government in Hungary and Slovenia). To weaken the position of the head of the state in comparison to parliament was chosen by the Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians and Slovenians.[30] Modification, which took place in the case of Slovakia (since 1998) and Slovenia, was a direct election of the head of state. *Jerzy Wiatr*[31] emphasizes that the system of executive power in Slovenia relies on two rules: giving executive power to the government and giving the parliament the power to accept or deny the government.

6.

Generally speaking, we can distinguish parliamentary-cabinet republics (Bulgaria, Macedonia and Croatia since the year 2000) and the republics with an active presidential role (Romania, Croatia till the year 2000, Albany till 1997) among the Balkan states. The real position of the head of the state results from the constitutional practice and regulations of fundamental

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[28] Cf., Lesage, M.: Le rôle du chef de l'État en période de transition. *Revue d'Etudes Comparatives Est-Ouest*, Vol. 23 1992) No. 4.

[29] See Jelavich, B.: *Historia Bałkanów, Wiek XX*, Kraków, 2005.; Tanty, M.: *Bałkany w XX wieku. Dzieje polityczne*. Warszawa, 2003.; Koseski, A.: *W bałkańskim tyglu*. Pułtusk, 2002.

[30] Zawadzka, B.: Zmiany systemu politycznego w ustawodawstwie państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. Warszawa, 1992.; Zagadnienia konstytucjonalizmu krajów Europy Środkowowschodniej (ed.: Mołdawa, T.). Warszawa, 2003.; Skotnicki, K.: Systemy rządów parlamentarnych w wybranych państwach Europy Środkowej (Czechy, Słowacja, Węgry). Konstytucyjne systemy rządów (ed.: Domagała, M.). Warszawa, 1997.; Sokolewicz, W.: Nowa rola konstytucji w postsocjalistycznych państwach Europy. „Państwo i Prawo", No. 10, 2000.

[31] See J. Wiatr, Słowenia – przykład udanej transformacji. Warszawa, 1998. 19.

acts (Serbia in the time of S. Milosevic, similarly in the time of F. Tudjman's presidency in Croatia). The head of the state may play the role of a mediator in the political system, or it can be the main organ of the governmental power. It should strongly be emphasized that after the alternation of power in Croatia, which happened in 2000, there was a formal return to the parliamentary-cabinet system, completed by an adequate novelization of the Constitution. Also, the case of Bulgaria places the mentioned governmental system model in the group of parliamentary countries, rationalized in relation to a classic model.

The most significant difference in comparison with the classic parliamentary-cabinet model is a choice of president in a general election.[32] In the case of the already mentioned Balkan countries, there has been a concentration of decisive processes on the line of parliament-cabinet within the weak political activity of the head of the state. Similar political solutions were introduced in Macedonia. The president has a function of a mediator and he is the exponent of the nation's unity.[33] The powers of the head of the state are described in a manner which is characteristic of the parliamentary-cabinet system (lack of legislative power, inability to manage a referendum). In the case of the Slovenian president, she/he has no right to vote against a legislative act.[34]

In case of shaping the political scene, we can generally distinguish two scenarios. The first one characterizes the Central European countries, while the second one is closer to the Balkan countries. In the first model, political groupings started to form themselves at the end of the 1980s (Hungary, Slovenia) or just after the democratic break (the casus of Czechoslovakia and GDR). In the 1990 election post-communist camps and broad civil movements' coalitions (Czechoslovakia, Slovakia); or already formed political parties fought (Hungary, Slovenia and GDR). On the other hand, in the Balkan countries, rejection of the mono-party took some time (generally in 1990, in the case of Albania even in 1991). Only in the case of Bulgaria functioned the broad coalition of the political movements (the Union of Democratic Powers – SDS), while in Romania, coalition of democratic groupings (Democratic Convention of Romania – CDR) was formed only in the second phase of transformations (after 1992). In other countries there was a rivalry between political groups – in contrast with strong post-communist ones there were traditional (liberal, conservative, agrarian), national (Croatia Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Macedonia) and ethnic (Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia) groups. In general, the first line of conflict in the political scene in Central Europe was a matter of the past. Additionally, there were national conflicts in the perspective of creating new state organisms[35] in the Balkan states.

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[32] See Gebethner, S.: Modele systemów rządów a ich regulacja konstytucyjna, Demokratyczne modele ustrojowe w rozwiązaniach ustrojowych. Warszawa 1997. 91.; Szymanek, J.: Modele systemów rządów - wstęp do analizy porównawczej. „Studia Prawnicze", No. 3, 2005.

[33] A manner in which *Stipe Mesić* (Croatia) and *Kiro Gligorova* (Macedonia) served their presidency had a significant role. It was a conciliatory and not a confrontational style.

[34] In a Slovenian solution the right to vote against legislative acts belongs to the Country Council, the second chamber of the parliament, which represents local and trade self-governments and which is chosen in indirect elections.

[35] Antoszewski, A.: Partie polityczne Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. Poznań-Wrocław, 2005.; Lewis, P. G.: Political parties in post-Communist Eastern Europe. London and New York, 2000.; New political parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (ed.: Szajkowski, B.). Harlow, Essex, 1991.; Party Formation in East-Central Europe (ed.: Wightman, G.). Edward Elgar, 1995., Politické strany ve střední a východní Evropé (eds.: Fiala, P. – Holzer, J. – Strmiska, M.). Brno, 2002.

7.

While discussing the matters of stabilization of party systems in this region of Europe we have to notice that diversification in the formation of a political scene has no fundamental influence on achieving consolidation of the party systems. In his list of the most stable party systems in 2006, *Andrzej Antoszewski* mentions: Albania, Romania (election of 1994) and Hungary (as an example of evolution towards a two-block balance). On the one hand, moderate multi-party system characterized the Czech Republic. On the other hand, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia are the examples of fighting the domination of one group with a balanced multi-party system. Unbalanced system functioned in Bulgaria and Albania (till 2001), while non-stabilized ones existed in Poland and Romania (till 2004).[36] The factors taken into consideration in constructing the given-above structural scheme were: amount of parties, their size, their degree of representation, the degree of support for the anti-system groups and the durability of models for creation of cabinet coalitions.

The important factor which differentiates political scenes in the so-called 'Young Democracies' is new groups which gain positions in the legislative institutions, or sometimes create governments by winning parliamentary elections. In the first context we should mention Palikot's Movement (Poland (2011), Public Affairs – VV in The Check Republic (2010), Solidarity and Freedom – SaS in Slovakia (2010), Politics Can Be Better in Hungary – LMP (2010). The second case can be exemplified by Civilians for European Bulgaria – GERB (2009) and Positive Slovenia – PS (2011).

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[36] Antoszewski, A.: Systemy partyjne Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. Czechy, Polska, Ukraina. Partie i systemy partyjne. Stan i perspektywy (eds.: Kowalczyk, K. - Tomczak, Ł.). Toruń, 2007. 24.